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ABSTRACT 
People continually rely on disinformation to make judgments after it is corrected or 
discredited. This phenomenon is termed the continued influence effect (CIE). Using a 
sample of 152 participants, the current study examined whether the CIE can be explained 
by a person’s political orientation, attention control (AC) levels, intolerance of ambiguity 
(IA) and need for specific closure (NSC). It was found that when political orientation was 
based on self-reports, the overall political conservatism did not predict the CIE (r = .13, p 
= .09) but economic conservatism did (r = .19, p < .05), suggesting that those with higher 
self-reported fiscally conservative attitudes may show more prolonged influence of 
disinformation. In addition, the overall AC levels did not predict the CIE (r = .08, p = 
.30), but the antisaccade scores reflecting the ability to inhibit automatic responses were a 
significant positive predictor of the CIE (r = .18, p < .05). Lastly, neither IA nor NSC 
significantly predicted the CIE (ps > .05). These findings were obtained with only one of 
two measures of the CIE employed, the warehouse fire paradigm (Johnson & Seifert, 
1994). Limitations of both the CIE and political orientation measures are discussed. One 
important implication of this work is that previous research may have depicted an 
incomplete picture of political orientation, and future studies should aim to capture 
various aspects of political orientation to further examine the association between various 
facets of conservatism and the CIE. In addition, more experimental studies should be 
adopted to better uncover the causal links proposed in this study. These findings may 
facilitate further exploration and understanding of the sources of the CIE.  
Keywords: continued influence effect; disinformation; conservatism; attention control; 
intolerance of ambiguity; need for specific closure 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
 Information in our era spreads quickly and widely but disinformation, false 
information that is accepted as true (e.g., fake news or false claims on the internet), 
spreads even more quickly than true information (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018), 
misleading the citizens and hampering their ability to make informed decisions. One 
characteristic of disinformation is that it is resistant to corrections and retractions 
(Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 
1988; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987). Uncovering the possible reasons of persistent influence 
of disinformation may help more effectively reduce its influence. The current study 
examined intolerance of ambiguity, need for specific closure, and attention control as 
factors contributing to the continued influence of disinformation and its higher 
prevalence among conservatives than liberals.  
Continued Influence Effect (CIE) 
Memory literature on primacy effect (e.g., Asch, 1946; Luchins, 1957) illustrated 
the persistent effect of earlier information on judgments trumping the later information. 
The proactive interference (e.g., Keppel & Underwood, 1962) also showed how prior 
information may interfere with the later information. The study of disinformation as this 
type of prior information is crucial due to serious implications of disinformation. One 
common type of disinformation is fake news and its amount and influence have increased 
remarkably. For example, fake news is considered to have contributed to the outcome of 
Brexit and the U.S. presidential campaigns in 2017 (Feingold, 2017; Lewandowsky, 
Cook, & Ecker, 2017).  
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Even more concerning is that disinformation keeps influencing people’s further 
judgments in the future after corrections and retractions. Research suggests that 
disinformation often (but not always) shows a continued influence on decision-making 
even after the disinformation is discredited (Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Ross et al., 
1975; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987), and even when 
explicit warnings about misleading information are given on the onset (Ecker, 
Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010). Johnson and Seifert (1994) coined the term “continued 
influence effect (CIE)” to describe this phenomenon. They developed a unique paradigm 
to assess the CIE and reported that when disinformation (e.g., “…volatile materials such 
as cans of oil paint and gas cylinders were reportedly stored in a closet where a 
warehouse fire occurred”) was corrected (e.g., “…reported volatile materials were 
removed from the closet before the fire”), participants continued to report disinformation-
based inferences on a final test. For example, when they were asked why the fire spread 
so quickly, they answered that oil fires were hard to put out, using details that were 
already corrected. 
Disinformation, Misinformation and Misinformation Effect 
 Before further exploration of the CIE, the clarification of the terminology is 
warranted. Most researchers studying the CIE have conflated the colloquial meaning of 
“misinformation” and the specific use of this term by cognitive psychologists. In 
cognitive psychology, the misinformation effect refers to the phenomenon in which 
misleading post-event information may make the observer report misleading details that 
were not in the original event (Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007). The misinformation 
effect and the CIE are two fundamentally different phenomena because in the 
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misinformation effect, the new information provided later changes the memory of the 
past, while in the CIE, the memory of the past is resistant to the new corrective 
information. For these two reasons, the current study uses the term “disinformation” to 
represent false information resistant to corrections provided later.  
Examples and Harms of the CIE 
The CIE can be very costly to the society. For example, there are still many 
individuals believing in the myth that vaccines cause autism despite numerous 
corrections (Kull, Ramsay, & Lewis, 2003). Due to the continued influence effect of this 
myth, many parents refuse to vaccinate their children. As a result, vaccination rates 
decreased while the rates of vaccination-preventable diseases noticeably increased, which 
required considerable expenditure to overcome (Poland & Jacobsen, 2011). Refusal to 
vaccinate does not only put children’s lives in peril, but also poses great risk to the 
society as a whole. Another example is global warming. Despite the undeniably strong 
evidence for climate change and its causes, there are still about 16% and 21% of people 
in America who do not believe it or are unsure about it correspondingly (Leiserowitz, 
Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg, & Howe, 2013). Other examples of the CIE include 
Brexit, with one of the contributing factors being the misinforming (or a misleading 
claim) that Great Britain was paying 350 million euros per week for EU membership, still 
common beliefs about presence of pre-war WMDs in Iraq or President Obama’s Muslim 
religion and birthplace in Kenya (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012) 
despite numerous retractions and corrections.  
 
 4 
Unsupported Accounts for the CIE 
Two simple explanations for the continued influence of disinformation were that 
participants do not notice or remember the correction or they do not make the 
connections between the initial information and the correction, but they were not 
supported (Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Ross et al., 1975; 
Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988).  Past research (Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Ross et al., 
1975; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988) has shown that participants do recollect the 
correction or the instruction to ignore previously shown messages when they were asked 
about the corrections directly. For example, Johnson and Seifert (1994) reported that 90% 
of the participants recalled the correction. This means that the account that participants do 
not remember correction is not sufficient to explain the CIE.  
In addition, Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988) forced the participants to make the 
connection between the correcting information and the disinformation by instructing the 
participants to infer what they should disregard. They found that the influence from 
disinformation in this condition was similar to the condition in which the participants 
were explicitly instructed what to disregard. Thus, the continued influence effect does not 
seem to derive from the failure to make connections between corrections and 
disinformation either.  
Another explanation was that the CIE occurs because disinformation produced 
inferences and judgements and thus when disinformation is corrected, the already 
generated inferences were not corrected and still influence future judgements (Graesser, 
1981; Hastie & Park, 1986). However, Johnson and Seifert (1994) found that when the 
information is corrected immediately after the presentation of disinformation, leaving 
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little time for the generation of inferences, influence from disinformation still existed and 
the CIE level was similar to the condition where the correction was delayed. Thus, this 
explanation was not supported either.  
Lastly, some researchers proposed that the CIE occurs because disinformation 
was more available compared to other information (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). This account was not supported either because Johnson and Seifert 
(1994) found that mere mentioning of some information that does not play a causal role 
in the scenario, or the priming of this information, did not lead to inferences based of it. 
Causal Role Account 
One explanation did receive some empirical support, which is called the causal 
role theory (Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Also referred to as the mental model account 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012), the theory claims that people prefer to structure a coherent 
scenario or mental model of an event. The disinformation plays a key role in such 
structuring and thus difficult to get rid of (Johnson & Seifert, 1994). In other words, 
participants fail to incorporate the correction into the mental model because a coherent 
mental model of the event is difficult to build without that specific piece of 
disinformation. Other pieces of information in the story may become fragmented without 
the disinformation connecting other pieces of information together (Johnson & Seifert, 
1994). Johnson and Seifert (1994) provided evidence for this theory by showing that 
when the correction provided an alternative cause, instead of simply discrediting the 
disinformation, the CIE decreased.  
The causal role explanation is also consistent with an earlier finding by Anderson, 
Lepper and Ross (1980). In this study, participants were given two case studies 
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suggesting that risk taking and success as a fire fighter have a positive or a negative 
relationship. Then some of the participants were asked to generate possible reasons why 
such relationship exists while other participants were not given this task. Afterwards, 
participants were debriefed that the two case studies were actually bogus. However, when 
personal beliefs about the relationship were assessed, those participants who generated 
possible reasons for the relationship showed stronger beliefs about the relationship in the 
case studies than those who did not go through such a task. The results indicate that when 
pieces of information are incorporated into a causal structure, they may become 
particularly resistant to correction. A more recent study (Gerrie, Belcher, & Garry, 2006) 
also showed that people make up memories to fill the gaps so that a coherent scenario can 
be established, suggesting the cognition is susceptible to disinformation when that piece 
of disinformation is needed to build a coherent mental presentation. While the causal role 
explanation illustrated a situational factor contributing to the CIE, the current study 
proposed three person-level factors causing the CIE, which are intolerance of ambiguity, 
need for specific closure and attention control.  
Intolerance of Ambiguity (IA): A Potential Cause of the CIE 
Explicit corrections create gaps in the scenario, which may make people so 
uncomfortable that they go for the wrong but coherent model rather than the correct but 
incomplete model (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). When a readily available piece of 
information providing a reasonable explanation for an event was discredited, an easy way 
to solve this conflict may be to ignore the correction and stick with the original scenario 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Following this logic, those who have low tolerance of 
incomplete or ambiguous scenarios may prefer a more complete story with 
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disinformation in. Consequently, people who are less tolerant of ambiguous situation may 
be more susceptible to the CIE.  
This tendency depicted above is referred to as intolerance of ambiguity. Coined 
by Frenkel-Brunswik (1948), intolerance of ambiguity (IA), refers to a general preference 
for unambiguous situations (Budner, 1962). The IA is generally considered as a 
characteristic adaptation today, but, originally it was considered as an attitudinal variable 
(Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948) encompassing one’s perception, emotion and cognition, and 
describing denial of ambivalent feelings and intolerance of ambiguous cognitive patterns. 
In her study of children with high and low prejudice, Frenkel-Brunswik (1948) observed 
that ethnocentric children prematurely reduced ambiguous cognitive stimuli, an 
ambiguous figure with a shape of a disk, to certainty or distorted the stimuli to more 
simple and stereotyped form, probably to make them more manageable. Frenkel-
Brunswik (1951) further described that those with high IA tend to prefer certainty, resist 
alternating stimuli, and select a solution prematurely and stick with it in ambiguous 
situations. They also prefer rigid dichotomizations into fixed groups, see things in a black 
and white manner and find it difficult to allow both good and bad characteristics in a 
person.  
 Later research following Frenkel-Brunswik (1948)’s work generally suggests that 
IA is a stable, dispositional and unidimensional variable underlying various reactions to 
ambiguous situations (Furnham & Marks, 2013). Some researchers argue that IA taps 
into several dimensions (Durrheim, 1998) but the vast majority of studies suggests that it 
is a unidimensional construct overall (Furnham & Marks, 2013). Although it is common 
for people to desire to resolve uncertainties, the extent of such desire differs among 
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individuals, and evidence suggests that IA is consistently related to various personality 
variables. For example, it is positively related to authoritarianism, dogmatism and 
ethnocentrism, and negatively related to openness, novelty seeking, enjoyment and need 
for cognition (for review, see Furnham & Marks, 2013).  
 Ellsberg (1961) defined one of the ambiguous situations as one where the required 
key information to make sense of circumstances or predict future outcomes is absent. 
This ambiguous situation resembles one where correction of the disinformation creates a 
fragmented scenario after the disinformation is discredited. Thus, compared to the 
scenario with disinformation in it, the corrected scenario can be more ambiguous if no 
alternative cause is given because the key information is no longer valid and usable. In 
addition, the corrected scenario can still be more ambiguous even when an alternative 
cause is provided because it is new to the person. The correction alternates the familiar 
situation with extra, new and contradictory information, and inevitably makes it more 
complex, unfamiliar and consequently more ambiguous (Budner, 1962). This idea is 
consistent with the finding that when an alternative cause was provided during correction, 
the CIE decreased but still was not completely eliminated (Johnson & Seifert, 1994).  
Need for Specific Closure (Closed Mindedness) 
 Following the research on IA, researchers made further efforts to better identify, 
understand and measure additional personality variables similar and related to but slightly 
different from IA, such as need for certainty (Kagan, 1972; Sorrentino & Short, 1986), 
need for structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) and need for closure (Kruglanski, Atash, 
De Grada, Mannetti, & Pierro, 2013). Among these variables, need for closure (NC) 
might be more closely related to CIE than others. Kruglanski defined NC as need for “an 
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answer on a given topic, any answer, as compared to confusion and ambiguity 
(Kruglanski, 1990, p. 337, italics in original).” The definition indicates that the dislike of 
ambiguity is a part of the conceptualization of need for closure and thus it should be 
related to intolerance of ambiguity. Later research indicates that they indeed are 
correlated at around .29 magnitude (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). In addition, the term 
“closure” originated from Gestalt theories and refers to the “subjective closing of gaps (in 
percepts, memories and actions), or the completion of incomplete forms, so as to 
constitute wholes (Drever, 1963, p. 40).” The causal role explanation for the CIE states 
that corrections create gaps in the scenario and in the context of gestalt theory, that 
explanation can be understood as that corrections lead to gaps and disturb the closure. 
Thus, those high in need for closure may ignore the correction and stick with the original 
information, especially those high in specific closure. 
 Need for closure is considered to originate from two tendencies, need for non-
specific closure and need for specific closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1998). Need for 
non-specific closure (also referred to as seizing or urgency) refers to a preference to 
obtain any closure as quickly as possible while need for specific closure (NSC, also 
referred to as freezing, permanence or closed-mindedness) refers to the tendency to 
maintain the closure by ignoring the new information, which is very similar to the 
phenomenon of CIE. Thus, conceptually, specific closure seems more closely related to 
the CIE than non-specific closure. In addition, research shows that person with stronger 
tendency to stick to the past closures may less likely to assimilate new information to 
existing beliefs (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995), more likely to resist persuasion and maintain 
beliefs when presented with new information (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Rice, 
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Okun, Farren, & Christiansen, 1991). Thus, NSC (i.e., the permanence tendencies) is 
considered to lead to the inclination to “freeze” the past established closures. Based on 
both conceptual and empirical evidence, the current study also examined whether NSC 
and the CIE are positively related.  
 In summary, those with higher IA may prefer the disinformation-based mental 
model since it is more coherent, familiar and thus less ambiguous. In addition, those with 
higher NSC may also prefer the disinformation-based mental model because it creates 
fewer gaps in the mental model and provides more closure. Thus, the first hypothesis of 
the current study was that higher IA (H1a) and NSC (H1b) would lead to more CIE and 
thus both would be positively related to the CIE (Figure 1&Figure 9). Although the 
hypotheses would not be tested based on true experimental manipulations, causal 
statements were still included to better explain the rationality behind the hypotheses.  
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesis 1.  
IA = Intolerance of Ambiguity, NSC = Need for Specific Closure, CIE = Continued Influence Effect  
IA and NSC as Confounding Factors behind the  
Relationship between Conservatism and CIE 
 Past research suggests that conservatism and the CIE could be related (Kull et al, 
2003; Travis, 2010) but this may not be a causal relationship and instead a spurious 
relationship due to influences of third variables such as IA and NSC on both 
conservatism and the CIE. Researchers (Kull et al, 2003; Travis, 2010) found that the 
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beliefs in incorrect information such as “President Obama is Muslim / was born in 
Kenya,” “There were WMD in Iraq before Iraq war,” “Vaccination causes autism,” 
“Global warming is a hoax” are more prevalent among conservatives after many years of 
correction of such disinformation. However, it is difficult to draw the conclusion that 
conservatives are more vulnerable to the CIE because there are some confounding factors 
in this phenomenon.  
 Firstly, conservatives are, in general, more susceptible to disinformation and thus 
the higher rates of the CIE in conservatives may be a byproduct of bigger base rate of 
disinformation in the first place (Pennycook & Rand, 2017). As such, maybe corrections 
do reduce disinformation’s influence to the same extent or in the same proportion among 
conservatives as in liberals, but because more conservatives believed the disinformation 
before correction, there are still more conservatives than liberals believing the 
disinformation after correction.  
 Secondly, higher rates of the CIE among conservatives may be due to a match 
between the type of disinformation and their specific worldviews (for review, see 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Worldviews of conservatives and liberals differ in many 
aspects, such as beliefs about threat, equality and government regulation (Jost et al., 
2007; Tetlock, 1983). For example, conservatives are more likely to believe that the 
world is a dangerous and threatening place than liberals (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 
2001). It’s possible that recent spreading of disinformation such as threats of WMDs in 
Iraq or a foreign-born Muslim president happened to match conservatives’ worldviews, 
causing the asymmetries of the CIE among conservatives and liberals (Lewandowsky, 
Ecker, & Cook, 2017). 
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 However, the findings above do not warrant change of certain worldviews. On the 
contrary, researchers suggest that because the CIE may have originated from distrust of 
the sources of correction, a more effective correction strategy would be delivering 
corrections through worldviews congruent sources or messengers to reduce resistance to 
worldview-inconsistent corrections (Lewandowsky et al., 2017). For example, evidence 
shows, unlike liberals and moderates, conservatives’ trust in science has been decreasing 
since 1970s (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013), especially trust in scientists 
who advocate for environmental protection (McCright, Dentzman, Charters, & Dietz, 
2013). Thus, it is possible that the CIE is observed more often among conservatives 
because correction did not come from more trusted sources. As such, a scenario-based 
study with novel, neutral disinformation and credible correction source to control the 
influence from these confounders (prior disinformation base rate, worldviews and source 
credibility) may help clarify whether conservatism is truly related to the CIE. But if the 
influence of all the confounders are controlled, why would conservatism still be related to 
the CIE? One possible answer is the third variable, IA.  
 Existent research suggests that conservatism is positively related to IA and NSC 
and each may be one of the underlying epistemic motives that contribute to conservatism 
as a motivated social cognition (Jost, 2017; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). 
The conservatives prefer traditional and familiar social structure and this preference may 
stem from the psychological need to attain certainty, simplicity and closure and avoid 
uncertainty, novelty, complexity and ambiguity. These central values distinguish political 
conservativism from political liberalism, along with other values such as need for 
security (Jost et al., 2007). In addition, as Russell (1950) pointed out, liberals and 
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conservatives differ not only in what they believe in, but also how they hold their beliefs. 
Conservatives tend to hold their beliefs in a closed-minded and dogmatic manner while 
liberals tend to hold their beliefs tentatively and ready to change their beliefs in the face 
of new evidence. Thus, IA and NSC (closed-mindedness) may give rise to conservative 
attitudes and should be positively related to conservatism.  
 Researchers have examined the relationship between conservatism and these 
epistemic motives. For example, a meta-analysis by Jost (2017) found that the overall 
magnitude of the relationship between IA and conservatism is at .26 (unweighted) and 
.20 (weighted) and between NC and conservatism is at .23 (unweighted) and .19 
(weighted). Although no meta-analyses examined the relationship between NSC and 
conservatism as one of the two motives underlying NC, it seems reasonable to infer that 
NSC may positively relate to conservatism. Thus, higher IA and NSC may lead to more 
conservative attitudes. As such, if, as hypothesized in H1, higher IA and NSC also lead to 
more CIE, then it is reasonable to infer that the conservatives show more CIE than 
liberals as a result of higher level of IA and NSC causing more conservative attitudes and 
more CIE. Thus, it was hypothesized that (H2) conservatism and the CIE would have a 
positive relationship (Figure 2 and Figure 9) but the relationship exists not because 
conservatism causes the CIE. Instead, (H3) this relationship (Figure 3 and Figure 9) 
exists because IA and NSC cause increase in both conservatism and the CIE, leading to a 
spurious relationship between conservatism and the CIE. Note that conservatism was 
treated as a bi-directional construct in this model. More specifically, low conservatism 
was considered as high liberalism and vice versa.  
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Figure 2. Hypothesis 2.  
CIE = Continued Influence Effect  
 
 
Figure 3. Hypothesis 3. 
IA = Intolerance of Ambiguity, NSC = Need for Specific Closure, CIE = Continued Influence Effect  
Attention Control as a Possible Cause of CIE 
 Besides IA, previous research suggests that individual differences in attention 
control (AC) may lead to different levels of susceptibility to the CIE (Hasher, Zacks, & 
May, 1999; Zaragoza & Lane, 1991). Firstly, AC likely plays a role in the CIE because 
attention is an essential component for encoding and retrieval processes of conscious 
recollection (Zaragoza & Lane, 1991). Research shows that diminishing attention through 
use of a secondary task at encoding or retrieval reduces participants’ correct recognition 
(Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Zaragoza & Lane, 1991). 
For encoding, greater AC may lead to the creation of stronger and more diverse cues that 
can be used at test. For retrieval, greater AC may lead to an enhancement of source-
monitoring ability to more accurately discern where contradictory information is 
presented. In this context, source monitoring refers to the discrimination of different 
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memories based on available contextual details (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). 
Thus, the greater availability of attentional processes, as indexed by greater levels of AC, 
may consequently lead to the reduced CIE by strengthening encoding processes, 
increasing recollection of correct source information, or some combination of the two.  
 In other words, incorrect recall of source information may lead to source 
misattribution or confusion, which then lead to the CIE. When tested on an event, both 
disinformation and actual facts can be activated, and one needs to rely on source 
monitoring to organize and evaluate the information based on their characteristics (Ayers 
& Reder, 1998; Johnson et al.,1993). For example, a person may remember contextual 
details of both disinformation and the correction but confuse the sources and falsely 
attribute the information that was discounted as fact. When incorrect information is 
retrieved, greater AC may more effectively retrieve source details and reject the 
information as incorrect.  
 Secondly, one construct related to AC, but not identical to it, is inhibitory control 
(IC), the ability to block goal-irrelevant information or representations triggered by the 
environment from entering working memory (Hasher et al., 1999). According to 
Oberauer (2001), IC plays a role in reducing the activation of irrelevant information in 
the long-term memory, thereby reducing the interference or distraction from it. Attention 
control makes sure that the correct task is executed while inhibitory control ensures that 
the task is executed with right information (Oberauer, SÜß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007). 
Thus, those with better AC and consequently better IC, are likely to more efficiently 
inhibit discredited disinformation after it is evaluated as invalid in source monitoring and 
thus less likely to further reason and infer based on the discredited disinformation.  
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 In summary, a person’s better attention control capacity may lead to stronger 
encoding of cues, more accurate search and use of source information at test, and greater 
inhibition of irrelevant information such as disinformation. As such, greater AC, through 
involvement in these processes, may lead to the reduced CIE. Thus, the fourth hypothesis 
of the current study was that attention control is one of the causes of the CIE and thus 
would be negatively correlated with the CIE (Figure 4 and Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 4. Hypothesis 4.  
AC = Attention Control, CIE = Continued Influence Effect 
Attention Control as a Potential Cause of Conservatism 
 Research indicates people with different political orientations (conservatives and 
liberals) not only differ in the contents of their attitudes, but also in cognitive styles, 
which potentially underlie different ideologies (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Porter, 2008; 
Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003). Meta-analyses (Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003) confirmed that 
liberals and conservatives differ significantly in dogmatism, cognitive/ perceptual 
rigidity, needs for order, structure and closure, intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty, 
integrative complexity, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self-deception and 
perceptions of threat.  
 Among various personal and environmental factors contributing to these 
differences, one factor may be differences in cognitive ability. For instance, conservatism 
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and receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit (meaningless and very vague statements) 
steadily show positive relationship (Jost, 2017). Sterling, Jost, and Pennycook (2016) 
found that economic conservatives, individuals who support free market ideology, 
showed lower scores on measures of verbal and fluid intelligence, and higher receptivity 
to pseudo-profound bullshit. Furthermore, the positive relationship between economic 
conservatism and bullshit receptivity was mediated by low verbal intelligence and higher 
reliance on heuristic processing. In line with these findings, the meta-analysis results by 
Jost (2017) showed that conservatism was negatively related to need for cognition 
(unweighted r = -.16 weighted r = -.09). These results suggest that conservatives may 
engage in heuristic or automatic thinking more often than liberals (Jost, 2017). One 
reason for this could be overall lower attention control ability among conservatives.  
 Those with lower attention control ability may need to exert more mental effort to 
govern a complex task, which consequently increase feelings of fatigue (Belmont, Agar, 
& Azouvi, 2009). Systematic (deliberate) processing is more demanding and requires 
more intentional involvement of attention control than automatic processing (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986) and thus if one has lower attention control ability, then it may be more 
adaptive for the person to engage in automatic processing more often to reduce subjective 
fatigue or burnout. Supporting this argument, recent research found that lower mental 
effort was positively related to conservativism (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & 
Blanchar, 2012; Van Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman, & Blanchar, 2015). Both groups of 
researchers (Van Berkel et al., 2015; Eidelman et al., 2012) found that factors that should 
reduce AC (e.g., alcohol intoxication, cognitive load, low-effort thought instructions etc.) 
increased conservatism.  
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 Thus, fifth hypothesis was that low attention control capacity would lead to higher 
conservatism and consequently, they would be negatively related (Figure 5 and Figure 9). 
As stated in hypothesis 4, it is possible that attention control capacities contribute to the 
CIE. As such, it is possible that conservatism and CIE are positively related because 
attention control ability influences both conservativism and CIE. Thus, sixth hypothesis 
was that attention control would drive (not mediate) the relationship between 
conservatism and the CIE (Figure 6 and Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 5. Hypothesis 5.  
AC = Attention control 
 
Figure 6. Hypothesis 6 
AC = Attention Control, CIE = Continued Influence Effect   
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Attention Control as a Potential Cause of IA and NSC 
 Differences in epistemic motivations such as IA and NSC may stem from 
attention control as well. For example, lower attention control ability may be related to 
higher IA and NSC because with less attention control resources available, one may find 
it difficult to process an ambiguous situation as is and may have to prematurely reduce 
the ambiguity to certainty or stick to the previous beliefs ignoring the novel and more 
complex information. In addition, one of the benefits of closure is reduced necessity for 
further information processing, which is especially beneficial when one is fatigued 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1998). Similarly, one with fewer attention control resources may 
prefer less information processing and thus prefer maintaining closure by ignoring new 
evidence or information.  
 However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have examined the relationship 
between attention control and epistemic motivations and thus this hypothesis would be 
close to explorative than confirmative. As such, the seventh hypothesis was that higher 
AC would reduce IA and NSC and hence they would be negatively related (Figure 7 and 
Figure 9). IA and NSC were considered as underlying conservatism and higher AC was 
also hypothesized to cause lower conservatism (H5). Put together, the eighth hypothesis 
was that higher AC would lead to lower IA and NSC which will consequently lead to 
lower conservatism (Figure 8 and Figure 9).   
 
Figure 7. Hypothesis 7.  
AC = Attention Control, IA = Intolerance of Ambiguity, NSC = Need for Specific Closure  
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Figure 8. Hypothesis 8. 
AC = Attention Control, IA = Intolerance of Ambiguity, NSC = Need for Specific Closure 
 In summary, the current study examined whether conservatism is positively 
related to continued reliance on disinformation during thinking and reasoning after 
corrections. Prior research results on this topic are inconclusive because they are 
confounded with worldviews, level of prior exposure to the disinformation and level of 
exposure to corrections as well as perceived credibility of the correction sources. Thus, 
the current study investigated this research question using a scenario with novel and 
neutral disinformation and trustworthy correction source.  
 In addition, intolerance of ambiguity, need for specific closure and attention 
control ability were examined as confounding variables that influence both conservatism 
and CIE and thus drive the positive relationship between the two. Lastly, the relationship 
between AC and IA /NSC were examined to see whether the relationship between 
conservatism and IA / NSC is driven by the third variable AC. All the hypotheses were 
examined simultaneously in a multivariate manner using path analysis, to reduce type I 
error (Figure 9). The examination of these variables related to the CIE together in one 
model may further advance the understanding of the potential sources of CIE, paving the 
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way for future experimental studies aiming to uncover the causal mechanisms behind CIE 
and reduce the magnitude of CIE.  
 
 
Figure 9. The Original Model.  
AC = Attention Control, IA = Intolerance of Ambiguity, NSC = Need for Specific Closure, CIE = Continued Influence Effect 
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CHAPTER II - METHOD 
Participants 
 Undergraduate students (N =160) from a public university in the southeastern 
United States and community volunteers were recruited. Some participants were students 
enrolled in introductory psychology courses and other psychology courses that require or 
allow participation in research for partial course credit. These students were recruited 
using SONA (https://usm.sona-systems.com), an online psychological research 
recruitment system used by the School of Psychology. Other participants (N = 38) were 
community volunteers recruited via craigslist advertisements or flyers posted at libraries 
on and off campus as well as a local Starbucks. These participants were compensated 
with $15 Walmart gift cards.   
 Loehlin (2004) suggested at least 100 and preferably 200 cases for Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) with less than 10 variables. Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino 
(2016) recommend a sample size 8 times of the number of variables plus 50 cases. 
Following this rule, the recommended sample size for this study would be 90 based on 
the four variables in the analysis. Another recommendation was 15 cases per observed 
variable, which yields 60.  
 To obtain adequate power, the current study recruited a total of 198 participants 
(54 male [27.3%], 143 female [72.2%] and 1 with missing response for gender [0.5%]) to 
compensate for data loss (e.g., cases with too much missing data or cases failing the 
validity items). Among these 198 participants, 46 participants were not included in the 
data analysis because they failed one or more of the validity-check items or missed more 
than 25% of the total data. Therefore, the final sample size was composed of 152 
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participants 39 men (26%) and 113 women (74%). Ethnicity of the participants was the 
following: 86 White or European American (56.6%), 47 Black or African American 
(30.9%), 8 Asian American (5.3%), 6 Latino (3.9%), 3 multicultural (2%), 1 American 
Indian (.7%), and 1 Pacific Islander (.7%) with a mean age of 20.19 years (SD = 3.49) 
and an age range 18 - 40 years. As for class standing, 84 were 1st year in college, 26 were 
2nd year, 21 were 3rd year, 13 were 4th year, 1 was 5th or higher and 7 were graduate or 
professional students.  
Materials 
Conservatism 
 Conservatism was measured by two different scales. The first scale included two 
bi-directional single-item measures of (a) social and (b) economic political orientation 
based on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative) (SEPO; 
Appendix A). The second scale is the 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale 
(SECS; Everett, 2013) which assesses one’s level of conservatism and liberalism 
regarding social and fascial issues using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (greater negativity) 
to 7 (greater positivity) (Appendix B). For all measures, higher scores indicated more 
conservative attitudes or less liberal attitudes. Everett (2013) reported good internal 
consistency reliability (α = .88, .87 and .70 for the total scale, social and economic 
subscales) despite relatively small number of items in the measure. In the current study, 
the internal consistency was good for the overall and social conservatism (.82 and .95) 
but poor for economic conservatism (.46). Adequate fit in confirmatory factor analysis 
and significant correlations with other related constructs such as resistance to change and 
dogmatism provided evidence for construct and concurrent validity (Everett, 2013).  
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Intolerance of Ambiguity  
Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance (MSTAT; McLain, 1993) 
containing 22 items was used to measure intolerance of ambiguity (IA) (Appendix C). 
Among all the measures for IA, MSTAT has the best psychometric properties overall 
(Furnham & Marks, 2013). The internal consistency of the measure was good (α = .89) in 
this study. Evidence for concurrent validity has been established from significant 
correlations with other measures of IA, such as Budner’s (1962) 16-item measure, Storey 
and Aldag’s (1983) 8-item measure and MacDonald’s (1970) 20-item measure. MSTAT 
scores are also correlated with measures of other related constructs such as receptivity to 
change, willingness to take risks and dogmatism (Furnham & Marks, 2013). Items 
assessing tolerance of ambiguity were reverse-coded and the average of the items was 
obtained so that the high score indicated high intolerance of ambiguity.  
Need for Specific Closure 
 Need for Closure Scale (NFC; Kruglanski et al., 2013) (Appendix D) is comprised 
of 5 sub-scales assessing 5 facets of need for closure, which are order, predictability, 
decisiveness, ambiguity and closed mindedness. The closed mindedness subscale 
assesses the need for specific closure and other four subscales measure the need for non-
specific closure to various capacities. The closed mindedness subscale is comprised of 8 
items and participants are asked to respond to these 8 items using a 6-point Likert scale, 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The average of the 8 items was obtained 
and thus the score of each participant ranged from 1 to 6, with higher scores indicating 
more close-minded attitudes. Kruglanski et al. (2013) reported that the reliability for the 
close-mindedness subscale was acceptable at around .6. In the current study it was .69. 
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Construct validity was established by the adequate loadings of the 6 first-order factors. 
Evidence for convergent validity is available given significant correlations with need for 
cognition (r = .32) and cognitive complexity (r = .31). Discriminant validity is evidenced 
by non-significant correlation (r = .08) with intolerance of ambiguity (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). But, in the current study, they were significantly correlated (r = .57, p 
< .01) 
Attention Control 
 A single measure of attention control is considered inadequate because it 
measures factors unrelated to AC (e.g., math or verbal ability) (Loehlin & Beaujean, 
2016). Thus, multiple indicators of different aspects of AC were used including 
operational span (OSPAN; working memory), antisaccade (inhibition) and the Stroop 
tasks (goal maintenance), and a composite score indicating a person’s overall attentional 
control ability was obtained based on the reaction times and error rates (Hutchison, 
2007). The battery is based on a battery originally used by Hutchison (2007) but the 
original OSPAN tasks are replaced with shortened OSPAN tasks by Foster et al. (2015), 
which showed good predictive validity despite the shortened length.  
 OSPAN. Operation span (OSPAN) task measures working memory capacity 
(Forster et al., 2015). The task is comprised of 6 trials and in each trial 2 to 7 pairs of a 
math problem (e.g., 10 x 2 - 5 = 10, Correct / Incorrect) and a letter (e.g., “N”) were 
presented to the participants, and they were asked to remember the letters in order. The 
number of math problem-letter pairs in a sequence increased and decreased randomly to 
accurately assess participants’ working memory. Those with higher working memory 
capacity will remember more letters in the trials and consequently receive higher OSPAN 
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scores. Span scores were obtained based on each letter correctly recalled in order and 
thus the highest span score was 27 (Forster et al., 2015). 
 Antisaccade. Antisaccade task assesses inhibitory control aspect of attention 
control (Guitton, Buchtel, & Douglas, 1985). On each trial, a large star  appeared in either 
left or right side for 100ms and then a target stimulus (O or Q) appeared on the opposite 
side of the screen for 100ms. The participants were instructed to look to the opposite 
direction from the flashed star to identify the target stimulus target before it disappears. 
There were 8 practice trials followed by 48 experimental trials. Because there were only 
two response options (O or Q), the chance for correct response was 50%. The antisaccade 
scores indicate the percentage of correct responses and thus higher scores indicate higher 
attention control ability.  
Stroop. Similar to the antisaccade task, the Stroop task measures goal 
maintenance and inhibitory control (Kane & Engle, 2003). The Stroop task was 
comprised of 36 incongruent trials with color words (red, green, blue and yellow) 
presented in another color (e.g., the word green presented in red, blue and yellow), 36 
congruent trials with color words in the same color and  48 neutral trials with neutral 
words (bad, deep and poor). Participants needed to keep the goal of naming the color of 
the word and resist the habitual responses of reading the word. Participants responded 
vocally to a microphone connected to a response box. The computer measured the latency 
from the stimulus presentation until the onset of the participants vocal response. The 
response accuracy was coded by the experimenter via a keyboard keypress. Stroop score 
was a composite score based on error rates and reaction times difference between 
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congruent and incongruent trials (both raw and standardized z scores). Thus, higher Stoop 
scores reflect lower attention control ability.  
Continued Influence Effect (CIE) 
 The CIE was measured based on disinformation-based inferences made after 
reading two sets of fictional police reports investigating warehouse fire (Appendix E) and 
jewelry theft (Appendix G). The police reports were adapted from the messages used by 
Johnson and Seifert (1994), who modified the reports from Wilkes and Leatherbarrow 
(1988). In each set, there were 13-14 messages of similar length in total, with each 
message comprised of 2 to 4 sentences. Unlike the original CIE measures using written 
messages, the current study used audio messages recorded by a female student without 
regional accent to further examine the scope of validity of the CIE measure. The 
participants were allowed to listen to the message as many times as they need but once 
they move forward, they could not return to the previous message. Both sets of messages 
include one piece of disinformation that were corrected later. The sequence in which the 
two stories appear were randomized. After listening to the audio messages of the first 
story, one of the measures included in the study randomly appeared as a distraction task.  
 Then the participants answered an open-ended questionnaire comprised of 22 
(Warehouse Fire Story; Appendix F) or 23 (Jewelry Theft Story; Appendix H) questions 
revised from Wilkes and Leatherbarrow (1988). The first 10 fact-checking questions 
examined the facts in the story and the other 10 to 11 inference-examination questions 
assessed participants’ inferences about the event. The last 2 correction-check questions 
examined whether the participants noticed the corrections.  
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 In the original study by Johnson and Seifert (1994), several different methods 
were used to code the CIE such as one based on response to the inference questions only, 
the other based on both the fact and inference questions and another based on free recall 
of the story. The problem was that the specific rationale for these different methods were 
not provided. In the current study, responses to inference questions were used to assess 
the CIE because the core of the CIE is based on the judgements made in response to the 
corrected disinformation rather than just memories about the disinformation and 
correction. In addition, many fact questions seemed irrelevant to the disinformation (e.g., 
“5. What business was the firm in?”). In contrast, all inference questions were closely 
related to the disinformation and correction (e.g., “1. Why did the fire spread so 
quickly?”). Another practical consideration was to shorten the time needed to code the 
responses. 
 Four undergraduate research assistants coded the responses and each response is 
coded by two coders. Any inconsistencies between the two coders were resolved by 
consulting the primary researcher. A response was coded as 1 if it reflected beliefs in the 
corrected disinformation including direct and uncontroverted references to the volatile 
materials such as the gas cylinders and painting materials or the son as a suspect for the 
jewelry theft. A reference was considered as uncontroverted if it mentions the 
disinformation without mentioning the correction. 
Procedure 
 A Dell desktop and monitor as well as a standard set of mouse and keyboard were 
used. Upon arrival, participant read the hard copies of the consent form and signed them. 
The measure of attention control was always administered first because it is relatively 
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more demanding cognitively. The researcher typed in the pre-determined subject number 
(from 101 to 350), which was used to match the data from attention control battery to the 
data collected via an online survey based on Qualtrics, a web-based survey tool 
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The participants were informed that the purpose of the study was 
to investigate the relationship between personality and information processing. The 
purpose of the study was kept vague so that most natural responses can be obtained.  
 Upon participants’ completion of the attention control battery, the researcher 
opened the link to a survey created via Qualtrics and entered the subject number. 
Participants were informed that they would listen to a series of audio messages and they 
can proceed at their own pace but they cannot return to the previous messages. They were 
also informed that they would need to recall the information later and answer related 
questions. After they read the story, one of the measures listed above (e.g., measure of 
conservatism, intolerance of ambiguity and need for specific closure) or a measure of 
general demographics appeared randomly as distraction tasks. Then the participants 
answered the open-ended questionnaire. The audio massages of the second story 
appeared afterwards, followed by the other measure as a distraction task. Then the second 
open-ended questionnaire about the second story were presented. Lastly, they completed 
the measures of conservatism, IA, need for specific closure and demographic information   
that did not appear as distraction tasks before and these measures were presented in 
random order to eliminate any sequence effects.  
 Meade and Craig (2012) recommended having up to three validity items (i.e., “I 
have never brushed my teeth”, or “Answer this question as very true”) to screen out the 
participants who are not paying attention and responding carelessly. Therefore, two 
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directed response items were intermixed with other questions in the Qualtrics survey. 
Upon the completion of all the tasks, the participants were debriefed and the experiment 
ended. The study took about 75 minutes to complete. 
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CHAPTER III – RESULTS 
Data Preparation 
 During the initial data screening, 4 cases with more than 25% of total missing 
data and 42 cases failing one or both of the validity items were screened out. Then 
frequencies and descriptive statistics were examined to find out invalid responses in the 
data. No obvious outliers were identified and 6 missing responses were imputed using 
linear trend at point. As a result, the final sample was comprised of 152 participants.   
After initial data screening procedures, the various measures were scored 
according to their respective manuals. The CIE score for each story (i.e., warehouse fire 
and jewelry theft) was calculated by summing the number of responses reflecting 
inferences based on the corrected disinformation (e.g., “The fire spread so quickly 
because of explosive materials in the closet.”). The average CIE score for each 
participant was obtained by taking the mean of the two stories’ total CIE scores. Correct 
memory proportion was also obtained based on the correct responses to 20 fact questions. 
The average correct memory proportion was .69, indicating the participants did 
remember most details of the two stories.  
Next, the five assumptions of correlational analyses were examined to make sure 
that the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity are met and the variables are on 
interval or ratio scales in nature (Field, 2013). Skewness and kurtosis were checked and 
no obvious violations of normality were found for the average CIE scores used to test the 
original hypotheses. However, the CIE scores based on the jewelry theft story were 
positively skewed as indicated by a pseudo z score of 6 (skewness statistic = 1.19, 
standard error = .20).  
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Next, the means, standard deviations, ranges, and zero-order correlations between 
all study variables were obtained to illustrate their bivariate relationship (see Tables 1 and 
2). All scales had acceptable reliability ranging from .69 to .89, except for the Economic 
Conservatism Sub-scale of the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS; α = 
.46).
  
Table 1  
Intercorrelations of All Study Variables for the Final Sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. CIE_mean                
2. CIE_fire .80**               
3. CIE_theft .62** .03              
4. AC  .11 .08 .07             
5. Stroop -.08 -.00 -.13 -.51**            
6. Antisaccade  .13 .18** -.02 .73** -.11           
7. OSPAN  .004 -.03 .05 .71** -.10 .22**          
8. SEPO .09 .13 -.03 -.04 -.06 -.05 -.07         
9. SEPO_SC .04 .06 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.01 -.07 .92**        
10. SEPO_EC -13 .19** -.04 -.04 -.10 -.08 -.06 .88** .62**       
11. SECS .06 .07 .02 .00 -.14 .02 -.13 .60** .56** .53**      
12. SECS_SC                           .01 .04 -.05 -.08 -.01 -.03 -.06 .61** .61** .47** .91**     
13. SECS_EC .12 .08 .10 .11 -.28** .07 -.12 .41** .31** .45** .82** .51**    
14. NSC .02 .03 -.04 -.08 .10 -.06 -.01 .23** .24** .18* .10. .14 .01   
15. IA -.02 -.04 -.01 .01 -.02 .00 .01 .11 .12 .08 -.08 -.05 -.10 .57**  
16. CMP .22** .23** .07 .30** -.10 .30** .16* .01 .00 .02 .09 -.01 .19* -.10 -.05 
 
Note: N = 152. CIE_mean = CIE mean of two stories; CIE_fire = CIE score of the fire story; AC = Attention Control; OSPAN = Operation Span; SEPO =Social and Economic Political Orientation 
Scale; SEPO_SC= Social Conservatism Sub-scale; SEPO_EC = Economic Conservatism Sub-scale; SECS = Social and Economic Conservatism Scale; SCES_SC = Social Conservatism Sub-scale; 
SECS_EC = Economic Conservatism Sub-scale; NSC = need for specific closure; IA = intolerance of ambiguity, CMP = correct memory proportion. *p < .05, ** p < .01, two tailed.  
Table 1 (continued).
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Table 2  
Means, Standard Deviations, Ranges, and Scale Reliabilities of All Study Variables for 
the Final Sample  
Variables M SD Range α 
1. CIE_mean 
2.42 1.19 0-10.5 † 
2. CIE_fire 
3.43 1.86 0-10 † 
3. CIE_theft 
1.41 1.42 0-11 † 
4. AC  
0 1 † † 
5. Stroop 
0 1 † † 
6. Antisaccade  
.74 .14 0-1 † 
7. OSPAN  
15.67 6.12 0-25 † 
8. SEPO 
4.13 1.39 1-7 .76 
9. SEPO_SC 
3.87 1.67 1-7 † 
10. SEPO_EC 
4.39 1.41 1-7 † 
11. SECS 
4.71 .92 1-7 .83 
12. SECS_SC                           
5.06 1.22 1-7 .85 
13. SECS_EC 
4.36 .88 1-7 .46 
14. NSC 
2.91 .67 1-6 .69 
15. IA 
3.80 .77 1-7 .89 
16.  CMP 
.69 .15 0-1 † 
 
Note: N = 152. CIE_mean = CIE mean of two stories; CIE_fire = CIE score of the fire story; AC = Attention Control; OSPAN = 
Operation Span; SEPO =Social and Economic Political Orientation Scale; SEPO_SC= Social Conservatism Sub-scale; SEPO_EC = 
Economic Conservatism Sub-scale; SECS = Social and Economic Conservatism Scale; SCES_SC = Social Conservatism Sub-scale; 
SECS_EC = Economic Conservatism Sub-scale; NSC = need for specific closure; IA = intolerance of ambiguity, CMP = correct 
memory proportion. *p < .05, ** p < .01, two tailed.  
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Tests of Stated Hypotheses 
All original hypotheses are summarized in the test model (Figure 9), and were 
examined together via path analysis using Mplus. Only observed variables and no latent 
variables were used in the analysis, since the focus of the study is the relationships among 
the variables instead of the measurement part. In addition, including the latent variables 
would have required a sample size too large to achieve during the time allotted for this 
project.  
Both the CIE and Political Orientation were regressed on Attention Control and 
Intolerance of Ambiguity (and Need for Specific Closure) via “ON” command and 
Political Orientation was correlated with the CIE via “with” command. Because 
Intolerance of Ambiguity (IA) and Need for Specific Closure (NSC) are similar but 
different constructs (r = .57, p < .001), they were tested in separate models, one analysis 
with IA and the other with NSC. Similarly, because the two measures of political 
orientation (i.e., the two single-item questions [SEPO] and the inventoried measure of 
Social Conservatism [SECS]) were only moderately correlated (r = .60, p < .001), they 
were tested separately.  
 All four models (IA & NSC by SEPO & SECS; more specifically, model 1 with 
IA & SEPO, model 2 with IA & SECS, model 3 with NSC & SEPO and model 4 with 
NSC & SECS) were just-identified models. None of the coefficients for the predicted 
paths were significant (ps > .05) (Figures 10-13), except for the path from NSC to SEPO, 
which was already established in the literature (r = .23, p < .005) and thus was not 
included in the original hypotheses. Thus, no hypotheses based on the original model 
were supported by the path analysis (Hypotheses 1- 8).  
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Figure 10. The Original Model with SEPO and Intolerance of Ambiguity. 
SEPO = Social and Economic Political Orientation Scale  
 
 
 
Figure 11. The Original Model with SEPO and Need for Specific Closure. 
SEPO = Social and Economic Political Orientation Scale  
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Figure 12. The Original Model with SECS and Intolerance of Ambiguity. 
SECS = Social and Economic Conservatism Scale  
 
 
 
Figure 13. The Original Model with SECS and Need for Specific Closure. 
SECS = Social and Economic Conservatism Scale  
 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Next, supplementary analyses were conducted to further explore the models, and 
the sub-scale scores were included in the correlation analyses. More specifically, the 
Social and Economic Conservatism sub-scale scores were analyzed separately because 
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they were not correlated particularly highly (r = .62, p < .001 for SEPO_EC and 
SEPO_SC and r = .51, p < .001 for SECS_EC and SECS_SC). In addition, the Stroop, 
Antisaccade and OSPAN scores in addition to the composite score of the three tasks were 
considered because they assess different aspects of Attention Control (Hutchison, 2007).  
 Furthermore, very oddly, the CIE scores of the two stories (warehouse fire and 
jewelry theft) did not correlate at all (r = .03, p = .69). One may argue that this may 
indicate there is not CIE at all. It’s possible that both CIE measures were invalid but also 
equally possible that just one of them was invalid while the other was valid. The analysis 
of the normality indicated possible positive skewness of the CIE scores based on the 
jewelry theft story (skewness statistic = 1.19, standard error = .20). These statistics 
suggest that the jewelry theft story-based CIE scores may not be suitable to be included 
in the analyses and thus only the CIE scores based on warehouse fire story were included 
in further exploratory analyses.  
 The correlation matrix showed that the only Attention Control task performance 
significantly related to the CIE scores based on the warehouse fire story (CIE_fire) was 
Antisaccade (r = .18, p < .05), although the direction was opposite to the original 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 4). It was originally hypothesized that Attention Control would 
be negatively related to the CIE, i.e., those with better attention control ability would 
show less CIE. In addition, although overall Political Orientation (SEPO) did not 
correlate with the CIE, Economic Conservatism measured via the bi-directional single-
question measures of Economic Conservatism (SEPO_EC) did significantly correlate 
with CIE_fire (r = .19, p < .05), providing partial support for Hypothesis 1. In addition, 
Economic Conservatism (SEPO_EC) was significantly correlated with Need for Specific 
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Closure (r = .18, p < .05) but not with Intolerance of Ambiguity (r = .08, p = .34). The 
path from Attention Control to Need for Specific Closure was removed due to non-
significant correlations between the two (r = - .06, p >.45). Based on these correlations, a 
new model was tested (Figure 14). The CIE scores based on the warehouse fire story 
(CIE_fire) and Economic Conservatism (SEPO_EC) were regressed on Antisaccade and 
Need for Specific Closure (NSC) with “ON” commands. SEPO_EC and CIE_fire scores 
were correlated via a “WITH” command.  
 The path from NCS to CIE_fire was not significant (β = .05, p = .57), consistent 
with the correlation matrix. In addition, while the path from NCS to SEPO_EC was 
significant (β = .17, p < .05), the path from Antisaccade to SEPO_EC was not significant 
(β = .07, p = .39), again consistent with the correlation matrix. Lastly, SEPO_EC and 
CIE_fire were still correlated (r = .21, p < .01). These results suggest that SEPO_EC does 
positively predict the CIE, providing partial support for Hypothesis 1. However, this 
correlation is unlikely to be caused by the third variables, i.e., Attention Control 
(indicated by Antisaccade) or Need for Specific Closure, acting as confounding variables 
since only one path from each of them to SEPO_EC and the CIE was significant (the path 
from NCS to SEPO_EC and Antisaccade to CIE_fire).  
 
  
 
 
Figure 14. The Original Model and the Alternative Model Side by Side. 
AC = Attention Control, IA = Intolerance of Ambiguity, NSC = Need for Specific Closure, CIE = Continued Influence Effect, CIE_fire = Continued Influence Effect Based on Warehouse Fire Story, 
Conservatism_EC = Economic Conservatism 
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CHAPTER IV – DISCUSSION 
 The current study examined whether the continued influence effect of 
disinformation is positively related to a person’s political orientation and whether this 
relationship is spuriously caused by two confounding variables, attention control and 
intolerance of ambiguity (or need for closure) exerting influence on both political 
orientation and the CIE. 
Political Orientation and the CIE  
 The results showed that when political orientation—social, economic or overall—
was measured with an inventorized measure (the Social and Economic Conservatism 
Scale, SECS; Everett, 2013), it was not related to the CIE. Similarly, social and overall 
political orientation measured with two single-item questions (Social and Economic 
Political Orientation; SEPO), did not relate to the CIE either. However, economic 
conservatism (SEPO_EC), measured with one of the two single-item questions (SEPO), 
did positively relate to the CIE. Importantly, political orientation is treated as bi-
directional in these assessments and thus high conservatism is considered as low 
liberalism and vice versa.  
 There are several implications here. The two measures of political orientation 
(SECS and SEPO) may have tapped into different aspects of political orientation. The 
SECS assesses political orientation based on attitudes toward specific topics (e.g., 
abortion, gun control, business and welfare). In contrast, the SEPO assesses how one 
views oneself globally in terms of social and economic political orientation. Thus, the 
SEPO seems to tap more into the overall political self-concept / self-perception as 
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opposed to the specific political attitudes that constitute a political orientation captured by 
the SECS.  
 As such, the results regarding the political orientation and the CIE suggest that a 
person’s specific political attitudes (captured by the SECS measure) may not predict 
whether a person is more likely to show continued influence of disinformation. Similarly, 
regardless whether a person views oneself as more conservative or liberal in general, or 
socially conservative or liberal, those self-views will not predict whether a person is more 
likely to be continually under the influence of disinformation after corrections. However, 
those who view themselves as more economically conservative or less economically 
liberal may be more likely to experience the continued influence effect of disinformation.  
 In addition, there seems to be a rather clear discrepancy between general self-
perception and actual attitudes toward specific economic policy issues. For example, self-
view of economic conservatism (SEPO_EC) and participants’ actual ideological stance 
on economic issues (SECS_EC) were only moderately correlated (r = .45, p < .01). This 
may partially explain why self-concept based economic political orientation (SEPO_EC) 
was a significant predictor of the CIE while the specific attitude based economic 
orientation (SECS_EC) was not.  
 The root of this discrepancy may have stemmed from poor self-knowledge. 
Previous research has shown that people tend to have poor self-knowledge in general (for 
review, see Wilson & Dunn, 2003); People remove some of their undesirable thoughts 
and feelings from awareness through different mechanisms such as repression, 
suppression and intentional forgetting, which may consequently lead to incomplete and 
flawed self-knowledge, including poor self-knowledge about one’s attitudes.  
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 The assumption of self-report-based attitudinal measures is that people can and 
are willing to accurately report their attitudes. However, some attitudes may not be 
readily available for introspection (Krosnick, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2005; Schwarz, 2008). 
The work on dual system of attitudes (Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000) and implicit 
and explicit evaluations (Gawronski & DeHouwer, 2014; Fazio & Olson, 2003) suggests 
that certain attitudes (usually ones assessed with implicit measures) are less well-known 
or accessible to the person than those assessed with more direct explicit measures.  
 Political attitudes have been studied with both explicit and implicit measures (for 
review, see Friese, Smith, Koever, & Bluemke, 2016; Gawronski, Galdi, & Arcuri, 2015) 
and it is generally found that such measures are moderately to highly correlated. When 
measuring political orientation using a liberal-conservative Implicit Association Test, the 
most common implicit measure of attitudes (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), Choma and Hafer (2009) found that implicit and explicit measures of political 
orientation were only moderately correlated (r = .48). The strength of this relationship 
may change depending on some moderators such as political knowledge (Choma & 
Hafer, 2009), such that the positive correlation is stronger among those who are more 
knowledgeable about politics. In addition, Karpinski, Steinman, and Hilton (2005) 
identified attitude importance as a moderator of the implicit-explicit political attitudes 
relationship: when the attitude is more important, the relationship is stronger. Perhaps 
incorporating a measure of implicit political orientation could provide further insights in 
future studies.  
 The current sample, with the mean age of 20, was comprised mainly of young 
college students (N = 145, 95.4%) despite intentional efforts to obtain more diverse 
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sample. In his criticisms of the reliance on a narrow data base of college students in 
social psychology, Sears (1986) pointed out that college students tend to have less 
crystallized attitudes which are still volatile and developing. Early adulthood (late teens 
to mid/late twenties) is a key period for the development of political self and unstable 
attitudes in adolescence stabilize in early adulthood (Sears & Funk, 1999). Their opinions 
start to diverge from their parents' due to experiences such as casting their first vote 
(Highton & Wolfinger, 2001), leaving home for work or higher education (Alwin, Cohen, 
& Newcomb, 1991), getting married and having children (Stoker & Jennings, 1995), or 
major events and national tides in this period (Plutzer, 2002). Major political events are 
more likely to be remembered and considered as important and influential to one's 
political development (Schuman & Rogers, 2004). Thus, college students’ understanding 
of the meaning of social and economic political orientation and their own political 
orientation is likely to be changing and developing, which may have contributed to the 
gap between self-perception and the actual attitudes. Future studies examining the 
association between political orientation and the CIE should attempt to recruit more 
diverse sample or test their relationships among different age groups to overcome the still 
common trend of heavy reliance on college students in social psychology research (Jones, 
2010) and improve generalizability of findings in this area.   
 Moreover, these results indicate that although it is a common practice to combine 
social and economic conservatism to reflect a person’s overall political orientation, the 
researchers should still consider examining social and economic political orientation 
separately when studying the phenomenon of CIE, especially with a sample of college 
students. Social and economic political orientation were highly correlated (.51 between 
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SECS_SC & SECS_EC; .62 between SEPO_SC & SEPO_EC) but the correlations still 
do not seem high enough to treat them as the same construct. If the sample size were 
bigger, the overall political orientation measured with the two single-item measures 
(SEPO) may turn out to be a positive predictor of the CIE since the p value was 
approaching significance (r = .123, p < .10). However, if examined separately, it is 
clearly the economic conservatism (SEPO_EC) (r = .19, p < .05) that contributed to this 
relationship rather than the social conservatism (SEPO_SC) (r = .06, p = .46).  
 It is important to point out that what has been examined in this study is the 
association between political orientation and the continued influence of neutral 
disinformation (e.g., there were explosive materials in the closet.), not political 
disinformation. The reason why the CIE of neutral, non-political disinformation was 
positively related to SEPO_EC but not SEPO_SC or general self-perception of one’s 
conservative level (SEPO) is unclear. Lewandowsky and colleagues (2017) argued that 
the match between a person’s worldview and the disinformation may play a role in the 
phenomenon of the CIE. But the current finding suggests that self-reported economic 
conservatism is associated with the CIE even when influence from worldviews is 
excluded.  
 Relatedly, the picture between the political orientation and the CIE might be even 
more complicated than what has been previously suggested, i.e., the conservatives might 
be more vulnerable to continued influence of disinformation (Kull et al, 2003; Travis, 
2010). Only one aspect of political orientation, the general self-perception of economic 
political orientation, was associated with the CIE while all other aspects of political 
orientations measured in this study did not. Duarte and colleagues (2015) voiced a 
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concern that the social psychology field is more homogenous and less politically diverse 
than ever as most psychologists identify as politically liberal. This trend may have 
contributed to the mischaracterization of conservatives or at least depicted an incomplete 
picture of conservatives among whom there is a huge heterogeneity. For example, social 
conservatism tends to be associated with lower cognitive ability, but economic 
conservatism tends to relate to higher cognitive ability (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & 
Haidt, 2012; Kemmelmeier, 2008).  
 Thus, future studies should measure various aspects of conservatism to further 
investigate the relationship between political orientation and the CIE by including both 
more general, self-perception-based measures, more specific attitudinal measures of 
political orientation, and even perhaps more subtle, implicit measures, to capture different 
aspects of political orientation. Plus, other types of conservatism (e.g., system-
justification [Jost & Banaji, 1994], social dominance orientation [SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994] and right-wing authoritarian [RWA; Altemeyer, 1996, 1998], 
etc.) may also differentially relate to the CIE and thus should be considered.   
Attention Control and the CIE 
 Similarly, the overall attention composite obtained based on Stroop, antisaccade 
and OSPAN task scores did not predict the CIE as hypothesized. However, antisaccade 
task scores were positively correlated with the CIE. What’s perplexing is the direction of 
the relationship. Antisaccade scores reflect the capacity to inhibit automatic responses 
and redirect attention measured. Thus, those with higher antisaccade scores should have 
shown less CIE as a result of stronger ability to prevent disinformation from entering 
working memory and influencing reasoning and judgements. However, the results 
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showed the opposite. Interestingly, these results are consistent with findings by Eslick, 
Fazio and Marsh (2011), who reported that highlighting disinformation in the text led to 
more disinformation-based errors. Highlighted disinformation should draw more 
attention and consequently more careful monitoring, which should have reduced 
disinformation-based errors. But they found the opposite. According to Eslick et al., 
drawing attention to disinformation may have facilitated the more efficient encoding of 
associations with the disinformation. Thus, it seems possible that more attention capacity 
may actually lead to more CIE in some contexts.  
 One caveat to interpret the relationship between attention control and CIE is that 
although attention control did not predict CIE in this study, it may still play a role in the 
processes related to the CIE. One weakness of the current design is that the responses to 
the CIE were provided by participants themselves without the presence of the research 
assistants. Although this procedure is consistent with the procedures adopted by previous 
studies of the CIE, it may not be ideal to assess the relationship between attention control 
and the CIE. A person with high attention control ability may not fully utilize one’s 
attention control capacity during the CIE measurement process as one did during the 
attention control assessment process. The attention control assessment process was done 
in the company of a research assistant, whose presence may encourage a person to try 
harder on attention control tasks and lead to more accurate assessment of one’s attention 
control ability. Thus, future studies should still consider experimental designs to 
manipulate attention control in different stages of the CIE measurement processes to 
further illustrate whether and how attention control contributes to the CIE. 
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NSC / IA and the CIE  
 It was hypothesized that intolerance of ambiguity (IA) and need for specific 
closure (NSC) will be positively related to the CIE but no significant relationships were 
found. One possible explanation is that one’s NSC and IA levels indeed do not predict 
whether a person may continually be under the influence of corrected disinformation. The 
very small correlation coefficients (-.01 to -.04) and large p values may support this 
explanation (.67 to .90). Another explanation could be that IA and NSC may still 
influence the CIE but using trait IA and NSC fails to capture this relationship because 
one’s IA and NSC levels may still fluctuate across different situations. Thus, future 
studies should still consider experimental designs and manipulating IA or NSC to 
investigate whether this manipulation causes changes in the CIE.  
Attention Control and Political Orientation  
 Previous studies found that manipulations that supposedly reduced attention 
control led to an increase in conservative attitudes (Eidelman et al., 2012; Van Berkel et 
al., 2015) implying that lower attention levels lead to more conservative attitudes. 
However, the current study found that attention control measured with antisaccade and 
OSPAN tasks did not relate to any aspect of political orientation (SEPO_SC, SEPO_EC, 
SEPO, SECS_SC & SECS; all ps > .05). The only statistically significant relationship 
was a negative relationship between Stroop task scores and economic conservative 
attitudes (SECS_EC) (r = -.28, p < .001). However, the direction of the relationship was 
opposite to that found in the previous studies. As pointed out before, Stroop tasks assess 
the goal maintenance aspect of the attention control. Thus, this result suggests that those 
who are better at maintaining goals in their mind (as indicted by low Stroop composite 
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scores) report more conservative attitudes. One explanation is that this is a type I error 
due to many correlation analyses run in the current study. Moreover, SECS_EC subscale 
showed very low internal consistency (α = .46), casting doubt on the validity of this 
measure and the relation involving it. Furthermore, this relationship was not replicated 
when economic conservatism was measured using a single-item measure of economic 
conservatism (SEPO_EC; r = -.09, p = .26).  
There is also an alternative explanation that this relationship between Antisaccade 
and SECS_EC is a true relationship. The relatively small p value (r = -.28, p < .005) may 
support this explanation. Also, the SECS_EC subscale may have indeed accurately 
measured this economic conservatism but the internal consistency was low because 
college students had less crystallized attitudes about various economic issues or were 
unfamiliar with them. Also, as pointed out before, economic conservative attitudes 
measured by the SECS (SECS_EC) and the single-item measure (SEPO_EC) were only 
moderately correlated (r = .45, p < .001), suggesting that they may capture different 
aspects of conservative attitudes, Thus, the other explanation can be that goal 
maintenance aspect of the attention control does indeed relate to a person’s attitudes 
about economic issues measured by SECS (limited government, welfare benefits [reverse 
coded], gun ownership, fiscal responsibility and business).  
 In summary, it seems possible that conservatism is not driven by lower attention 
control as suggested by previous studies and actually, some aspect of the attention control 
(e.g., higher ability to maintain goals) and certain type of conservatism (e.g., more 
conservative attitudes toward fiscal issues) are positively related. As stated before, the 
trend of reduced political diversity in psychology field may have led to incomplete 
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characterization of conservatives missing the heterogeneity and nuanced differences 
among the conservatives and liberals. Because this is only the first study with such a 
finding, future studies should attempt direct replications or conceptual replications by 
including measures tapping into other aspects of conservatism (e.g., system-justification, 
SDO and RWA, etc.) to further reveal the relationship between attention control and 
conservatism and consequently depict a more complete picture of conservatives and 
liberals.  
NCS /IA and Political Orientation 
 Although previous studies often found positive relationships between need for 
closure / intolerance of ambiguity (IA) and political orientation, the current study found 
that only need for specific closure (subset of need for closure) correlated with political 
orientation measured with two single-item questions (SEPO; r = .23, p < .005) but not 
with the inventorized measure of political orientation (SECS; r = .11, p = .16). This is 
consistent with the previous findings since this line of research often used single-item 
questions to measure political orientations (Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003) instead of 
inventorized measures such as the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS; 
Everett, 2013), which was used only infrequently.  
 What is perplexing is that intolerance of ambiguity was not related to either 
measure of political orientation, including the social and economic conservatism sub-
scales. Previous meta- analyses (Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003,) found that intolerance of 
ambiguity and conservatism were consistently correlated (.20 to .34). One explanation is 
that intolerance of ambiguity correlates better with certain aspects of conservatism such 
as ethnocentrism (O’Connor, 1952) or authoritarianism (e.g., Kenny & Ginsberg, 1958; 
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Pawlickp & Almquist, 1973). The other explanation can be that there may exist some 
moderators that alter this relationship. One such moderator could be gender. When this 
relationship was examined among men and women separately, a significant relationship 
was found among men (r = .32, p < .05), but not among women (r = .08, p = .40). 
However, this is only a post-hoc analysis and there was a gender imbalance in the sample 
recruited (39 men vs. 113 women). Thus, this speculation should be treated with extreme 
caution but future studies will need to consider examining the possible moderating effect 
of gender on the relationship between intolerance of ambiguity and political orientation.  
Attention Control and NSC / IA  
An exploratory hypothesis (Hypothesis 7) that one source of individual 
differences in NCS and IA was attention control capacity was also examined, but the data 
did not support this hypothesis (ps > .05). This could mean that attention control is not 
one of the causes that lead to individual differences in NSC or IA. However, another 
explanation could be that some variables may moderate this relationship. When men and 
women were analyzed separately, Stroop scores showed a significant positive 
relationship with IA among men (r = .33, p < .05), suggesting that men with lower 
capacity to maintain goals cognitively (higher Stroop scores) will report more intolerance 
of ambiguity levels, which is consistent with the study hypothesis (Hypothesis 7). But no 
such relationship was found among women (r = -.16, p = .09). Again, this post-hoc 
analysis result should be treated with caution because the significant relationship could 
well be just type I error or unstable p value due to a small sample size of men (n = 39). 
Future studies with sufficient and similar number of men and women participants should 
further examine the possible moderating effect of gender on this relationship. In addition, 
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experimental designs that manipulate attention control, or even better, the specific ability 
to maintain goals, are needed to better uncover the possible causal link between attention 
control and NSC / IA.  
Other Limitations and Future Research 
 The standard method to assess the CIE is based on memories and inferences about 
one story participants read. However, to ensure more variability in the responses, two 
stories were included in the current study, a story about fire inside a warehouse 
(CIE_fire) and a story about jewelry theft in a house (CIE_theft), both of which were 
validated in the original study by Johnson and Seifert (1994), with more evidence for the 
warehouse fire story since it was used several times, while the jewelry theft story was 
only used once for replication purpose. In the current study, the responses to the jewelry 
theft story showed possible skewness issue (skewness statistic = 1.20, Std. Error = .20). 
In addition, compared to the fire story, the theft story had a much lower mean (1.41 vs. 
3.43) and a slightly lower standard deviation (1.42 vs. 1.86) and range (6 vs. 8). So 
overall, the jewelry theft story seems to have lower validity than the fire story as a 
measure of the CIE. This may explain why the CIE scores from the two stories did not 
correlate (r = .03, p = .70). Future studies are advised to use jewelry theft story with 
caution especially when using only one story to assess the CIE.  
 In addition, to further test the validity of the CIE assessment paradigm, the current 
study used audio recordings of the stories, instead of written materials, as the input, while 
the response process was done by typing responses on a computer. It is unclear whether 
this change of input method has influenced the validity of the CIE measures since the 
format was not manipulated in this study. Future studies are encouraged to conceptually 
 53 
replicate the CIE measure paradigm by manipulating input formats such as audio 
recordings or video clips to examine whether these changes in input affect the validity of 
the CIE measures.  
 Lastly, this is a correlational study and thus findings do not allow causal 
inferences. Experimental designs with specific manipulations (e.g., attention control) 
similar to studies done by Van Berkel et al. (2015) or Eidelman et al. (2012) may help to 
better uncover the causes of the CIE.  
Conclusion 
 This study was the first systematic examination of person-level sources of the CIE 
and found that the CIE measured with the warehouse fire paradigm was positively related 
to self-reported levels of economic conservatism and inhibition aspects of attention 
control. The CIE was not related to intolerance of ambiguity or need for specific closure. 
In summary, the current study provides some initial evidence regarding person-level 
sources of the CIE and possible directions for future studies. 
 
 
  
APPENDIX A – Social and Economic Political Orientation Scale (SEPO) 
 
1. Politically, how would you describe yourself on SOCIAL ISSUES (e.g., morals, freedoms)? 
 
Very Liberal 
1 
Liberal 
2 
Somewhat Liberal 
3 
Moderate 
4 
Somewhat 
Conservative 
5 
Conservative 
6 
Very 
Conservative 
7 
 
 
 
2. Politically, how would you describe yourself on FISCAL ISSUES (e.g., money, taxes)? 
Very Liberal 
1 
Liberal 
2 
Somewhat Liberal 
3 
Moderate 
4 
Somewhat 
Conservative 
5 
Conservative 
6 
Very 
Conservative 
7 
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APPENDIX B – The 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you feel positive or negative towards each issue. Scores 
of 1 indicate greater negativity, and scores of 7 indicate greater positivity. Scores of 4 
indicate that you feel neutral about the issue. 
 
1. Abortion.   
2. Limited government  
3. Military and national security.    
4. Religion.    
5. Welfare benefits (reverse scored).  
6. Gun ownership.   
7. Traditional marriage.   
8. Traditional values.  
9. Fiscal responsibility.   
10. Business.   
11. The family unit.   
12. Patriotism.  
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APPENDIX C – Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance (MSTAT) 
 
Complete the following questionnaire by indicating the extent to which you agree with 
the following statements.  
 
1. I don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well.  
2. I find it difficult to respond when faced with an unexpected event.  
3. I don’t think new situations are any more threating than familiar situations.  
4. I’m drawn to situations which can be interpreted in more than one way.  
5. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different 
perspectives.  
6. I try to avoid situations which are ambiguous.  
7. I am good at managing unpredictable situations.  
8. I prefer familiar situations to new ones. 
9. Problems which cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little threating. 
10. I avoid situations which are too complicated for me to easily understand.  
11. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations.  
12. I enjoy tackling problems which are complex enough to be ambiguous.  
13. I try to avoid problems which don’t seem to have only one “best” solution.  
14. I often find myself looking for something new, rather than trying to hold things 
constant in my life.  
15. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity.  
16. I dislike ambiguous situations.  
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17. Some problems are so complex that just trying to understand them is fun.  
18. I have little trouble coping with unexpected events.  
19. I pursue problem situations which are so complex some people call them “mind 
boggling.”  
20. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain.  
21. I enjoy an occasional surprise.  
22. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity. 
1.........strongly disagree  
2....moderately disagree  
3...........slightly disagree  
4..........................neutral  
5................slightly agree   
6.........moderately agree  
7..............strongly agree 
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APPENDIX D – Need for Closure Scale (NFC) 
“Attitude, Belief and Experience Survey” 
Instructions: Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with 
each according to your beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the 
following scale. 
1.........strongly disagree  
2....moderately disagree  
3...........slightly disagree  
4................slightly agree  
5.........moderately agree  
6..............strongly agree 
1. I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.  
2. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider 
a different opinion.  
3. I don't like situations that are uncertain.  
4. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.  
5. I like to have friends who are unpredictable.  
6. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.  
7. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might 
happen.  
8. When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to 
expect.  
9. I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my 
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life.  
10. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group 
believes.  
11. I hate to change my plans at the last minute.  
12. I would describe myself as indecisive.  
13. When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is I want.  
14. When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly  
15. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset.  
16. I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment.  
17. I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.  
18. I have never been late for an appointment or work.  
19. I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment.  
20. My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.  
21. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong.  
22. I have never known someone I did not like.  
23. I tend to struggle with most decisions.  
24. I believe orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of 
a good student.  
25. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could 
be right.   
26. I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.  
27. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them.  
28. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and 
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requirements. 
29. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the 
issue as possible.  
30. I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.  
31. I like to know what people are thinking all the time.  
32. I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things.  
33. It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind.  
34. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.  
35. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.  
36. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own.  
37. I like to have a plan for everything and a place for everything.  
38. I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me.  
39. I believe that one should never engage in leisure activities.  
40. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's 
confusing.  
41. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face.  
42. I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.  
43. I feel that there is no such thing as an honest mistake.  
44. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view.  
45. I dislike unpredictable situations.  
46. I have never hurt another person's feelings.  
47. I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies). 
Need for specific closure is in bold.
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APPENDIX E – CIE Measure 1: Warehouse Fire Scenario 
Message 1 
 Jan. 25th 8:58 p.m. Alarm call received from premises of a wholesale stationery 
warehouse. Premises consist of offices, display room, and storage hall.  
Message 2 
 A serious fire was reported in the storage hall, already out of control and requiring 
instant response. Fire engine dispatched at 9:00 p.m. 
Message 3 
 The alarm was raised by the night security guard, who had smelled smoke and 
gone to investigate. 
Message 4 
 Jan, 26th 4:00 a.m. Attending fire captain suggests that the fire was started by a 
short circuit in the wiring of a closet off the main storage hall. Police now investigating.  
Message 5  
 4:30 a.m. Message received from Policies Investigator Lucas saying that they 
have reports that cans of oil paint and pressurized gas cylinders had been present in the 
closet before the fire.  
Message 6 
 Firefighters attending the scene report thick, oily smoke and sheets of flames 
hampering their efforts, and an intense heat that made the fire particularly difficult to 
bring under control.  
Message 7 
 It has been learned that a number of explosions occurred during the blaze, which 
endangered firefighters in the vicinity. No fatalities were reported. 
Message 8 
 Two firefighters are reported to have been taken to the hospital as a result of 
breathing toxic fumes that built up in the area in which they were working.  
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Message 9 
 A small fire had been discovered on the same premises, six months previously. It 
had been successfully tackled by the workers themselves.  
Message 10 
 10:00 a.m. The owner of the affected premises estimates that total damage will 
amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars, although the premises were insured.  
Message 11 
 10:40 a.m. A second message received from Police Investigator Lucas regarding 
the investigation into the fire. It stated that the closet reportedly containing cans of oil 
pain and gas cylinders had actually been empty before the fire.  
Message 12 
 The shipping supervisor has disclosed that the storage hall contained bales of 
paper, mailing and legal-size envelopes; scissors, pencils, and other school supplies; and 
a large number of photo-copying machine.  
Message 13 
 11:30 a.m. Attending fire captain reports that the fire is now out and that the 
storage hall has been completely gutted.  
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APPENDIX F – Questions for Warehouse Fire Scenario 
 
Fact Questions 
1. What was the extent of the firm’s premises? 
2. Where did an attending firefight think the fire started? 
3. Where on the premises was the fire located? 
4. What features of the fire were noted by the security guard? 
5. What business was the firm in? 
6. When was the fire engine dispatched? 
7. What was in the storage hall 
8. What was the cost of the damage done? 
9. How was it thought the fire started? 
10. When was the fire eventually put out? 
Inference Questions 
1. Why did the fire spread so quickly? 
2. For what reason might an insurance claim be refused? 
3. What was the possible cause of the toxic fumes? 
4. What was the relevance of the closet? 
5. What aspect of the fire might the police want to continue investigating? 
6. Why do you think the fire was particularly intense? 
7. What is the most likely cause of the fire that the workers successfully put out 
earlier? 
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8. What could have caused the explosions? 
9. Where was the probable location of the explosions? 
10. Is there any evidence of careless management? 
Manipulation Check Questions 
1. What was the point of the second message from the police? 
2. Were you aware of any corrections in the reports that you read? 
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APPENDIX G – CIE Measure 2: Jewelry Theft Story 
 
In this section, you will listen to the recorded audio messages in your own pace. Click the 
next button when you are ready to proceed to the next message. You will not be able to 
go back and listen to any previous messages. You will be asked to recall the information 
in the messages later. 
Message 1  
3:00 p.m., May 2nd. Police respond to a call made from a home on Acorn St., in a 
middle-class residential neighborhood.  
Message 2  
The homeowner, Ms. Harter, reports that her jewelry box is missing. Contents are 
reported to include gold chains, gold and silver earrings, rings, and pendants of precious 
stones.  
Message 3  
She discovered that the box was missing when she returned from a vacation and wanted 
to put a new necklace she'd bought in it. It had been stored in a locked drawer in her 
bedroom dresser.  
Message 4  
She swears she had checked the box before leaving on vacation, and everything was in 
order. A tall tree arches near the bedroom window, but police have found no evidence of 
tampering with the window.  
Message 5  
The Harters report that they had asked their son, Evan, to check in on the house 
periodically during their absence. The son also did other odd jobs for many of the 
neighbors.  
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Message 6 
Police suspect that Evan may have taken the box from the house to help pay off large 
gambling debts.  
Message 7  
The neighborhood has been hit with a number of thefts recently. There are no arrests or 
leads in these cases so far.  
Message 8  
The Harters' next-door neighbor reports that she noticed a light on in the house, after her 
dog suddenly began barking late Saturday evening, April 28th. An unfamiliar dark-
colored car had been parked in a nearby alley.  
Message 9  
A search for footprints and tire tracks has turned up inconclusive, due to a recent 
rainstorm. In the course of the investigation, an officer noted a broken latch on a 
basement window.  
Message 10  
Police are still attempting to determine whether other valuables are missing from the 
house. The television and a home computer had not been disturbed, however.  
Message 11  
The Harters have contacted their insurance company about the loss. The last appraisal 
showed the box's contents to be worth several thousand dollars.  
Message 12  
A second message from the police investigators about the incident. It stated that the 
Harters' son is no longer a suspect, because several independent sources confirm that he 
had been out of town on business during the Harters' vacation.  
01 Message13  
Ms. Harter is considering offering a reward for return of several of the pieces, because 
they have great sentimental value for her. There would be no questions asked.  
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Message 14  
Detectives will look for similarities between this case and the other 3 thefts reported in 
the neighborhood recently.  
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APPENDIX H – Questions for Jewelry Theft Story  
 
Please answer each question on the basis of your understanding of the series of audio 
messages you listened to several minutes ago regarding the jewelry theft. 
Cause Question  
      1. What caused the box to be missing from the Harters' home?  
Fact Questions  
2. How much did an appraisal show the box's contents to be worth?  
3. Where was the Harters' home located?  
4. Where was the jewelry box normally kept?  
5. Why did Ms. Harter consider offering a reward?  
6. What did the Harters' next-door neighbor notice?  
7. What kinds of jewelry did the box contain?  
8. What arrangements did the Harters make for checking up on the house?  
9. When did Ms. Harter discover that the jewelry box was missing?  
10. What did police notice about the bedroom window?  
11. When did the neighbor's dog suddenly start barking?  
Inference Questions  
12. Why might the neighbor's dog have been barking? 
13. Whose car might the neighbor have noticed, parked in the alley?  
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14. Why might the son feel bad about the incident?  
14. What could the Harters have done to better avoid this problem?  
15. Who, if anyone, should be questioned more thoroughly by the police?  
16. Why wasn't the television taken?  
17. How might the thief have gotten into the house?  
18. Why might the Harters be angry with their son?  
19. What might be responsible for the other thefts in the neighbor- hood recently?  
20. What steps should the police take next?  
21. Where was Evan Harter on the evening of April 28th?  
Manipulation Check Questions  
22. What did the police investigators report about where Evan Harter was during the 
Harters' vacation? 
23. What facts about the case did the police change their minds about, based on 
information they discovered later?
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